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Governing without breaking the party: Lessons from Lesotho’s “splits-in-power” era and what RFP must do to finish strong

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Theko Tlebere

Therefore, the challenge facing the Revolution for Prosperity (RFP) extends beyond mere concerns about road repairs, reform progress, or improving performance indicators. The more profound question is whether a party can govern without fracturing from within. In Lesotho, this is a significant challenge.

History that we all know highlights the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), the Democratic Congress (DC), the Reformed Congress of Lesotho (RCL), the Movement for Economic Change (MEC), the Alliance for Democrats (AD) and even the All Basotho Convention (ABC) during the tumultuous “Malumara” and “Likatana” period that ultimately led to the formation of Basotho Action Party (BAP), all of them did not splinter in isolation. Their most destabilising conflicts arose while they were in power, when decisions made in the cabinet and Parliament became inseparable from internal party rivalries.

Consequently, the damage inflicted was national rather than merely internal. When a ruling party starts to bleed internally, the state quickly becomes a casualty. Cabinet cohesion weakens, parliamentary stability falters, coalition agreements become rigid, governance slows, and ordinary citizens suffer due to delayed services and stalled reforms.

To avoid repeating this pattern as a country, we must confront the reality of the cycle itself. Lesotho’s political history reveals a persistent issue: a party wins power, government authority reshapes the party, and the party eventually fractures under the burden of that power. The collapse of the LCD and the emergence of the DC were not simply personal disputes; they were conflicts exacerbated by the pressures of governance (remember the ‘lijamollo and litimamollo’ factions). Similarly, the later formation of RCL by Hon Keketso Rantšo, who was then secretary general of LCD, reminds us of a turbulent time in the then ruling LCD under Mothetjoa Metsing.

It didn’t rain but it poured for LCD because even the formation of MEC in 2016 by Hon Selibe Mochoboroane, who was also secretary general of LCD at the time, was a culmination of a power struggle within the party, which reinforces the same dynamic: internal competition becomes existential once state power is at stake. The DC’s internal divisions, culminating in the creation of AD just before the 2017 elections, further illustrate that government is not a neutral playing field; it is a high-stakes environment where internal rivals vie for access, influence, and succession.

The ABC’s internal struggles, which led to years of instability and the eventual splintering into BAP, reinforce this lesson: when the line between party conflict and state control blurs, the party turns into a battlefield, and the government becomes collateral damage. It does not even end there; even the party suffers, as we can all attest by the poor performance of ABC in the 2022 elections.

Many leaders make a critical mistake when discussing unity. They treat it as a moral stance, believing it can be achieved through loyalty speeches, public warnings, and disciplined slogans. However, unity within a ruling party is not primarily a moral achievement; it is an institutional phenomenon. It relies on credible rules that regulate ambition, constrain retaliation, manage succession, and establish safe pathways for competition. Without these institutional safeguards, power acts like a solvent, eroding trust, corroding structures, and transforming ordinary disagreements into major rifts.

The harsh reality is that government decisions directly impact the stability of political parties. Governing introduces a new currency: appointments, promotions, tenders, board positions, committee influence, access to information, proximity to the leader, and control over who gets heard. Even when leaders assert they are acting based on merit, politics is not driven solely by official explanations.

It operates on perceptions that solidify into factional narratives. A reshuffle, for instance, if ntate Sam Matekane was to do it,  would not transcend into mere administrative adjustment; it would become a signal of who is rising and who is being sidelined. And that would mean serious trouble in Parliament because it is clear most ruling party Members of Parliament(MPs) are eager and ready to join the executive, but the problem would be who shall be appointed, and all party loyalists are happy.

A good stalemate example is the energy ministry vacancy that has been left to an acting capacity for more than a year now, just to manage the internal politics of the ruling party.

The appointment of a principal secretary is not just a bureaucratic decision; it indicates which faction is gaining control. A parastatal board appointment is not merely governance; it serves as a reward mechanism. In such a climate, intra-party competition shifts from ideological and programmatic debates to a more perilous focus on access and exclusion. Being able to manage all this for me is critical for a ruling party. I will still dwell on the issue of whether the current ruling party is managing that very well in some other writings that I will do this year.

This complexity makes leadership in a ruling party uniquely challenging. A party leader in government is accountable to two different constituencies: the country, which demands stability, delivery, competence, and reform, and the party, which seeks representation, internal voice, fairness, recognition, and opportunities for ambition. When these expectations clash, leaders often resort to shortcuts that may appear efficient in the short term but are detrimental in the long run.

Some leaders govern through the party, using the cabinet and public service as tools for internal discipline. Others manage the party through government, transforming party structures into waiting rooms for state benefits and leveraging public appointments as bargaining chips. In both scenarios, the outcome is the same: the party ceases to function as an organisation with rules and instead behaves like a survival marketplace.

In the context of the current ruling party RFP, the elective conference emerges as a moment of significant risk. Ideally, an elective conference represents the pinnacle of internal democracy. However, in Lesotho’s experience, it often becomes a battleground for internal conflict, determining control over candidate lists, parliamentary leadership, disciplinary mechanisms, and proximity to state power. A conference in a ruling party is never merely about positions; it concerns the future distribution of power and access. Therefore, our observation about the lack of an elective conference in the RFP is not paranoia; it reflects the understanding that, in Lesotho, conferences can either strengthen institutions or ignite factional strife, depending on how they are prepared for and managed.

The key analytical insight, highlighted by Lesotho’s recent history, is that political parties tend to fracture when factions perceive internal losses as threats to their survival. Without credible assurances for the losing side, internal competition becomes a matter of existential consequence. If the prevailing sentiment is that the victor claims everything while the vanquished face purging, exclusion, humiliation, or a bleak future, contests become fiercely combative. Members fight as though their political lives are at stake, and indeed, they may be. This fear of extinction drives preemptive rebellion, prompting individuals to leave not out of animosity toward the party, but because they believe there is no secure place for them if they lose…

Let me stop here this week, next we will dig deeper into what a ruling party should do to govern itself, with institutions that are strong enough to wield power without being corrupted by that power…. The Future is NOW!

Summary

  • Yet, almost inevitably, those who win the political power and enter the big offices, take their seats at the head of the table, and soon find themselves entangled in the internal conflicts of their ruling party, igniting a fever of factionalism.
  • History that we all know highlights the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), the Democratic Congress (DC), the Reformed Congress of Lesotho (RCL), the Movement for Economic Change (MEC), the Alliance for Democrats (AD) and even the All Basotho Convention (ABC) during the tumultuous “Malumara” and “Likatana” period that ultimately led to the formation of Basotho Action Party (BAP), all of them did not splinter in isolation.
  • It didn’t rain but it poured for LCD because even the formation of MEC in 2016 by Hon Selibe Mochoboroane, who was also secretary general of LCD at the time, was a culmination of a power struggle within the party, which reinforces the same dynamic.
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