Lipholo is not misguided: The Lesotho – South Africa land issue in context

“The land is the only thing in the world worth working for, worth fighting for and worth dying for because it is the only thing in the world that lasts” – Margaret Mitchell (1900 – 1949)

Nkopane Mathibeli

On March 29, 2023, a relatively unknown Member of Parliament (MP) tabled a motion seeking the return of land once stolen from King Moshoeshoe I. A year and a half later, on October 24, 2024, Afrobarometer released the findings of its survey on whether Basotho want their land lost to South Africa. 71% of the participants responded in the affirmative; 61% strongly agreed. The largest portion of this land he alludes to (129,825 km²) was stolen through the Bloemfontein Convention of 1854 before being converted into a Boer republic called the Free State. The name of this Member of Parliament (MP) is Rev Dr Tšepo Lipholo; a leader and sole MP of the Basotho Covenant Movement (BCM).

Verbatim, the motion read: That this Honourable House, resolves, pursuant to Section 1(2) of the Constitution, to declare the whole of the Free State, parts of the Northern Cape, parts of the Eastern Cape, parts of Mpumalanga and parts of Kwazulu Natal as comprising the territory of the Kingdom of Lesotho in line with the United Nations Resolution 1817(XVII) passed by the General Assembly at its 1196^th Plenary Meeting of 18^th December, 1962.

As clarified by the last few words of the last sentence of the motion, Lipholo’s role is that of a catalyst for the enforcement of this old resolution of the United Nations. It must be noted that it is his motion that got a handful of opportunistic political parties frantically pronouncing themselves on this issue, an issue that none ever mentioned anywhere at any given time as part of their political programme. In other words, their newfound interest in this issue has absolutely nothing to do with their political ingenuity, itself a very rare commodity in Lesotho political circles. Given the importance of this motion in rectifying a very serious historical injustice of land dispossession, it is important to first have an appreciation of two things about it: (a) how the United Nations General Assembly came to pass it and (b) why the resolution remains unimplemented sixty-three years later.

The journey to UN Resolution 1817(XVII)

On December 14, 1960, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed Resolution 1514 (XV) titled the “Declaration of granting independence to colonial countries and peoples”. To monitor its implementation, it established the Special Committee on Decolonisation eleven months later (November 27, 1961), made up of twenty-four countries. Africa was represented by five, namely, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mali, Somaliland and the then Tanganyika. As a result of the full-blown frustration of political formations in Lesotho, Botswana and Eswatini with the seeming reluctance of the government of the United Kingdom to implement Resolution 1514 (XV), a group of five petitioners from these three countries made a total of eight presentations to the Special Committee on Decolonisation. They were led by Ntsu Mokhehle in his capacity as President of the then Basutoland Congress Party (BCP).

These presentations spanned eight meetings held in New York, Tangier, Addis Ababa and Dar es Salaam between May 11 and June 7, 1962. From Lesotho, Mokhehle was accompanied by Mr G.P. Ramoreboli. Swaziland was represented by Mr J.N. Nquku in his capacity as President of the Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP). From Botswana, there was Mr P. Matante in his capacity as Deputy President of the Botswana Peoples Party (BPP). On December 18, 1962, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) responded by passing the Resolution that forms the backbone of MP Lipholo’s motion – UN Resolution 1817(XVII). It was titled: Question of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland.

The gist of Resolution 1817(XVII)

In line with the concerns outlined by the Mokhehle-led petitioners, this resolution outlined all conditions to be met by the then administering power (UK) for the total decolonisation of these territories. These were: (1) grant inhabitants their right to self determination; (2) ensure that elections are held based on universal suffrage; (3) set the date of independence in consultation with all political formations; (4) establish a model/mechanism backed by UN programmes and agencies to provide economic, financial and technical assistance to these territories; (5) take immediate steps to return land dispossessed in whatever form or pretext from these territories; (6) ensure that there won’t be any annexation or encroachment of these territories.

Due to UNGA’s oversight, the government of the United Kingdom did indeed implement five of these six conditions as outlined in Resolution 1817(XVII). The most urgent and highly significant issue is that all these territories were granted their rights to self-determination and independence. Botswana was granted independence on September 30, 1966; Lesotho on October 4, 1966, and Eswatini on September 6, 1968. Since their respective independence dates, each of these three territories became beneficiaries of all sorts of UN-driven economic, financial and technical assistance gestures. Lastly, the aspiration of apartheid South Africa to incorporate each of these territories never saw the light of day. However, only one condition was never implemented, i.e. condition (5) about returning land dispossessed from these territories.

Cause of indefinite deferment

In the case of Lesotho, two factors are seemingly considered as legitimate causes for this deferment. The first one is Resolution AHG/Res. 16(1) of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), popularly known as the Cairo Declaration of 1964. Verbatim, its gist is that the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments of the OAU “Solemnly declares that all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence”.

The second one is that claiming such land risks provoking conflict between Lesotho and South Africa. Seemingly to avoid this, Lesotho’s foreign minister (Lejone Mpotjoane) proposed an approach different from that of Dr Lipholo. For context’s sake, in January 2025, Lipholo travelled to the USA to submit a petition to the United Nations after his motion came to nought in parliament. Also petitioned were the UNSC, the governments of the UK, Lesotho and South Africa. On the other hand, the alternate route proposed by Minister Mpotjoane entails consulting international political analysts.

However, given the overall perspective of academic debates/discussions/analyses over the years about relations between Lesotho and South Africa, it is easy to predict the outcome of such consultations. Generally described as a small, poor country completely surrounded by and dependent on South Africa, Lesotho is advised in flowery language to adapt to its vulnerable status by being submissive, not assertive. History, however, proves that this has not minimised but exacerbated this vulnerability. Central to this status is not its enclave nature, as generally argued. If this were the case, San Marino, which is completely surrounded by Italy, would be facing similar vulnerabilities, but it is not.

On the contrary, the vulnerability of Lesotho is rooted in two factors. The first one is its historical and intentional economic subjugation through the dispossession of 81.1% of its land. The second one is its political class, which pursues political power as an end in itself; a parasitic class that does not have much to offer by way of development and reversing the subjugation. This explains both the government and opposition’s reluctance to fully support Dr Lipholo’s motion. Instead, the opposition parties hold independent positions while the government presents its cowardice as diplomacy and hides behind the now-defunct 1964 Cairo Declaration.

What is the Cairo Declaration?

Though never revoked, is it still worthwhile to consider the Cairo Declaration? I ask because in spite of its existence, four land/border disputes involving eight African countries were successfully resolved between 1994 and 2010. Briefly, they are as follows. On February 3, 1994, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in favour of Chad in a dispute it had with Libya regarding a 114,000 km² piece of land called the Aouzou strip. A point of reference that gave Chad its victory was a treaty signed by the two countries in 1955 called the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness.

With no legitimate recourse, Libya was forced to withdraw from the territory. On December 13, 1999, the ICJ ruled in favour of Botswana in a dispute it had with its neighbour, Namibia, regarding a 5km² piece of land called Kasikili/Sedudu Island. On October 10, 2002, the ICJ ruled in favour of Cameroon in a dispute it had with its neighbour, Nigeria, regarding a 665 km² oil-rich piece of land called the Bakassi peninsula. Nigeria was forced to withdraw from the territory.

Lastly, on December 22, 1986, the ICJ gave a ruling that fixed the disputed border between Mali and Burkina Faso. Finality was reached in 2010. What besides cowardice prevents Lesotho/Basotho offsetting processes that lead towards closure in the pending Lesotho – South Africa land issue? Absolutely nothing.

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